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s.c. No. 37236-2009 
Custer County Case No. CR-2007-S0 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
PINES GRAZING ASSOCIATION, INC. 
Plaintiff / Respondent 
vs. 
FLYING JOSEPH RANCH, L.L.C. 
Defendant / Appellant 
SUPPLEMENTAL CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appealed from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, ill and for the Coullty of Custer;. 
Before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge 
Curt R. Thomsen, Esq. 
P.O. Box 600 
Challis, ID 83226 
Attorney for PlaintijjlRespondent 
Cynthia J. Woolley, Esq. 
P.O. Box 6999 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Attorneyfor Defendant/Appellant 
INDEX 
SUPPLEMENTAL CLERK'S RECORD 
ORDER ON OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD (FILEDlO/2-/2010)-----------1-3 
REGISTER OF ACTIONS - HEARING FOR 7/22/2009 VACATED---------------- 4 
DFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIMANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
(F ILED 71 16/09 )------------------------------------------------------------------------------5 -64 
SEP/20/2010/MON 08:20 AM COURTS FAX No. 208-52 909 P. 002 
i« '>.: . ,~" , 'i RUT'fi1it{ij~KER 
ZUlG 
--~ . ...:.....~.:. :..:...-  ..::....;...;......-~:;..~:-..:.  ...:.~~.:-. ..::--.;...~:.-,;,: ... :...--. -~tN~MJtDt~£:tRJCT.-:CQW~~QF :I2~E=£~WN.:tM-lOOtGfA~1)i£~ruc~---·-· -~ -~--~ .~.~ ----.--.-. ---_.-
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
PINES GRAZING ASSOCIATION, INC., an 
Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff! cQunterdefendarit, 
vs. 
FL YING JOSEPH RANCH, LLC, An Idaho 
limited liability company; J.C. 
INVESTMENTS, a foreign Corporation, 
Defendants/counterclaimants. 
Case No. CV-07-0050 
ORDER ON OBJECTION TO CLERK'S 
RECORD 
Currently before the Court is Defendant's objection to the clerk's record on appeal. In 
Defendant's notice of appeal, Defendant requested that the clerk's record contain the documents 
"automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R." and "all requested and given jury instructions." 
This Court finds that a hearing on the objection is not necessary and in the interests of judicial 
economy and expediency rules as follows. 
In considering Defendant's objection, the Court refers to Rule 28 and the documents 
which are automatically included in a standard clerk's record. Defendant asserts that the record 
is missing "all briefs on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss". However, briefs are not included in a 
standard record and were not requested in the notice of appeal. This objection is overruled. 
Defendant objects that the record is missing the "Decision on Second Motion to 
Dismiss". Court rulings should be included in the standard record and to the extent the record is 
missing the referenced decision, the decision is to be included in the record. This objection is 
sustained. 
ORDER ON OBJECTION - 1 
SHILunUIU/MON ue:L1 AM CUUkT~ FAX No, 208-52 p, 003 
Defendant objectsthat the record does not contain an affidavit in support of defendants' 
were not requested in the notice of appeal. See Ru1e 28(a), LA.R. This objection is overruled, 
Defendant objects that the record does not contain all summary judgment briefs. Briefs 
were not requested and are not part of the standard record. This objection is overruled. 
Defendant objects that the page between pages 69 and 71 is not numbered as is the page 
between pages 72 and 74. Pages in the clerk's record should be numbered and this objection is 
sustained. 
Defendant objects that the signature page of a "StipUlation to Vacate and Re-set Trial 
Date" dated October 9, 2008, is missing. Stipu1ations were not requested in the notice of appeal 
and are not part of a standard record. This objection is overruled. 
Defendant objects that the record does not contain Defendant's proposed jury 
instructions. In the notice of appeal Defendant specifically requested all requested and given jury 
instructions and therefore, all proposed jury instructions should be included in the clerk's record. 
This objection is sustained. 
THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Defendant's objection to the clerk's record is 
sustained in part and overru1ed in part. The Clerk should include in the clerk's record on appeal 
the documents for which the objection was sustained. The hearing scheduled for October 20, 
2010 is vacated. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this "C:0 day of September, 2010. 
ORDER ON OBJECTION - 2 
~U/LU/LUIU/NIUN u~:n ANI f. UU4 
I hereby certify that on this dO day of September, 2010, I did send a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon. 
curt R. Thomsen 
P.O. Box 600 
Challis, ID 83226 
Cynthia J. Woolley 
P.O. Box 6999 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
ORDER ON OBJECTION ~ 3 
BARBARA TIERNEY 
Clerk of the District Court 
Custer County, Idaho 
BY~~_ 
Deputy erk 
Date: 9/29/2010 
Time: 02:42 PM 
Page 5 of9 
icial District Court - Custer County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0000050 Current Judge: Joel E Tingey 
Pines Grazing Association vs. Flying Joseph Ranch, Llc, etal. 
User: RUTH 
Pines Grazing Association vs. Flying Joseph Ranch, Llc, J.C. Investments 
Date 
6/412009 
6/18/2009 
6/23/2009 
7/8i2009 
7/13/2009 
7/15/2009 
7/16/2009 
7/22/2009 
7/24/2009 
7/27/2009 
7/29/2009 
Code 
NOTC 
HRHD 
CMIN 
MINE 
MEMO 
NOHR 
HRSC 
OBJC 
JRYI 
EXHI 
WITN 
EXHI 
JRYI 
CMIN 
MISC 
HRHD 
VERD 
JRYI 
JDMT 
STAT 
CDIS 
HRSC 
User 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RUTH 
LAlLA 
LAlLA 
LAlLA 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RUTH 
RF.hTSTF.R OF ACTIONS 
Judge 
Notice of Telephonic Hearing for Pre-Trial Joel E Tingey 
Conference 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Joel E Tingey 
06/17/200902:30 PM: Hearing Held Woolley-
Telephonically 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Pretrial Conference Joel E Tingey 
Hearing date: 6/1712009 Time: 2:30 pm 
Minute Entry Joel E Tingey 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Second Joel E Tingey 
Motion to Dismiss 
Notice Of Hearing Joel E Tingey 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss Joel E Tingey 
07/22/2009 09:00 AM) Defendant's Second 
Motion to Disimiss 
Plaintiff's Reply and Objection to Defendants' Joel E Tingey 
Second Motion to Dismiss 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on Joel E Tingey 
07/22/200909:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Defendant's Second Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Requested Jury Instructions and Verdict Joel E Tingey 
Form 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-17 Joel E Tingey 
Defendants/Counterciaimants' Witness List Joel E Tingey 
Defendants/Counterciaimants' Trial Exhibit List Joel E Tingey 
Defendants/Counterciaimants' Proposed Jury Joel E Tingey 
Instructions 
Court Minutes Joel E Tingey 
Hearing type: Jury Trial 
Hearing date: 7/22/2009 Time: 10:11 am 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Ruth Brunker 
Excused Jurors List Joel E Tingey 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/22/2009 Joel E Tingey 
09:30 AM: Hearing Held 
Special Verdict Form 
Jury Instructions 
Judgment Upon Verdict 
STATUS CHANGED: closed 
Joel E Tingey 
Joel E Tingey 
Joel E Tingey 
Joel E Tingey 
Civil Disposition entered for: Pines Grazing Joel E Tingey 
Association" Plaintiff; J.C. Investments" 
Defendant; Flying Joseph Ranch, Llc" Defendant. 
Filing date: 7/2712009 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/19/200902:30 Joel E Tingey 
PM) Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys Fees, Cost 
and Prejudgment Interest 
- 4 -
7/15/2009 5:25 p~ ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879-( 
CYNTHIA 1. WOOLLEY, ISB #6018 
cynthia@ketchumidaholaw.com 
LA W OFFICES OF CYNTHIA 1. WOOLLEY, PLLC 
P.O. BOX 6999 
180 First St. West, Suite 107 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
(208) 725-5356 
Fax: (208) 725-5569 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
PAGE: 002 OF 061 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
PINES GRAZING ASSOCIATION, INC., 
An Idaho Corporation, acting through its 
statutory trustees, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
FLYING JOSEPH RANCH, L.L.C., An 
Idaho Limited Liability company; 
J.C. INVESTMENTS, a foreign Corporation 
or other entity. 
Defendants/Counterclaiman ts. 
Case No.: CV-2007 - 50 
DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
COME NOW the Defendants/Counterc1aimants, Flying Joseph Ranch, L.L.c. and J.e. 
Investments, by and through their attorney, Cynthia J. Woolley, of The Law Offices of Cynthia 
J. Woolley, PLLC, and hereby submit their proposed jury instructions. 
DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIMANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -
7/15/2009 5:25 P~ vROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) S79-e PAGE: 003 OF 061 
DATED this 15th day of July, 2009. 
LA W OFFICES OF CYNTHIA 1. WOOLLEY, PLLC 
CYNTHIA J. WOOLLEY 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIMANTS' PROPOSED JURy INSTRUCTIONS· 
7/15/2009 5:25 p~ ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879-6' PAGE: 004 OF 061 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on July 15,2009, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document upon the attorney(s) named below in the manner noted: 
Curt R. Thomsen .. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC ( ) U.S. MaIL; Postage PrepaId 
P.O. Box 600 ( ) Hand ~eliver~d 
Challis, ID 83226 ( ) Over~ll~ht MaIL 
Fax (208) 879-6672 (X) Facs~mIle ( ) E-maIL 
LAW OFFICES OF CYNTHIA J. WOOLLEY, PLLC 
CYNTHIA 1. WOOLLEY 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIMANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -
7/15/2009 5:25 P~ ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (20B) 879-~' PAGE: 005 OF 061 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
PlNES GRAZING ASSOCIATION, INC., 
An Idaho Cozporation, acting through its 
statutory trustees, 
PlaintlfflCounterdefendant, 
vs. 
FLYING JOSEPH RANCH, L.L.C., An 
Idaho Limited Liability company; 
J.e.INVESTMENTS, a foreign Corporation 
or other entity. 
Defendants/Counterclaimants 
Case No.: CV-2007 - 50 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
We the jury, duly empanelled and sworn to try the above-entitled action, answer the 
questions submitted to us in this verdict as follows: 
Question No.1 
Was the alleged agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendants entered into for a 
lawful purpose? 
MARKONLYONEOFTBEFOLLOWINGVERDICTS 
ANSWER: YES __ _ NO ___ _ 
~ 
.................... ,...& ... ------ -
7{15{2009 5:25 PM vROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879-6' PAGE: 006 OF 061 
Question No.2 
Did the Plaintiff, Pines Grazing Association, Inc, provide valid consideration to the 
Defendants for the contract Plaintiff seeks to enforce? 
ANSWER: YES __ _ NO __ _ 
Question No.3 
Was there mutual agreement by the Plaintiff and the Defendants regarding all essential 
terms of the alleged contract? 
ANSWER: YES __ _ NO ___ _ 
Question No.4 
Did a valid contract exist between the Plaintiff and Defendant, Flying Joseph Ranch, 
L.L.C.? 
ANSWER: YES NO __ _ 
IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO QUESTION NO 4, ANSWER QUESTION NO.5 
Question No.5 
Did the Defendant, Flying Joseph Ranch, L.L.C. breach the contract with the Plaintiff? 
ANSWER: YES NO __ _ 
Question No.6 
Did a valid contract exist between the Plaintiff and Defendant, J.C. Investments? 
ANSWER: YES __ _ NO ___ _ 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879-6f PAGE: 007 OF 061 
IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO QUESTION NO 6, ANSWER QUESTION NO.7 
Question No.7 
Did the Defendant, J.C. Investments breach the contract with the Plaintiff? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
----
Question No.8 
Was the Plaintiff damaged as a result of the Defendant's breach of contract? 
ANSWER: YES NO __ _ 
IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO QUESTION NO 8 ANSWER QUESTION NO.9 
Question No.9 
What is the amount of damages that Defendants should pay to the Plaintiff? 
$_-----
nuestion No. 10 
Did the Plaintiffbreaclt' a valid C<jntract with the Defendants? 
ANSWER: YES N(j 
----
IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO QUESTION NO 10 ANSWER QUESTION NO. 11 
Question No. 11 
What is the amount of damages that Plaintiff should pay the Defendants? 
$_-----
7 (15(2009 5: 25 ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 87 PAGE: 008 OF 061 
DATED: July ---' 2009 
Signature of presiding juror if verdict 
is unanimous 
OR if only five jurors agree, signature of those five jurors: 
.., .... ~,., ........... ,,------ . 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 87 
Section 1.00 - General Procedure 
IDJI 1.00 - Introductory instruction to jury 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
PAGE: 009 OF 061 
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that 
applies to this case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set 
forth in these instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. 
Your decision should be based upon a rational and objective assessment of the 
evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice. 
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the 
case, and it is your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider 
these instructions as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The 
order in which these instructions are given or the manner in which they are 
numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If you do 
not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, 
and I will try to clarify or explain the point further. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted 
in this trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the 
exhibits admitted into evidence, and any stipulated or admitted facts. While 
the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you understand the 
evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an 
7(15(2009 5:25 PM ~~OM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 8 PAGE: 010 OF 061 
attorney's argument or remark has no basis in tbe evidence, you sbould 
disregard it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At 
times during the trial, I sustained an objection to a question witbout permitting 
the witness to answer it, or to an offered exhibit witbout receiving it into 
evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my responsibility. You 
must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my 
ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a 
question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have 
shown. Remember, a question is not evidence and should be considered only 
as it gives meaning to the answer. 
{There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer 
was given or the remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I 
instructed that the answer or remark be stricken, or directed that you 
disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In your 
deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it 
as though you had never heard it] 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in 
the course of the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what 
evidence you believe and what weight you attach to it In so doing, you bring 
with you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. 
7(15/2009 5:25 VROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 8 PAGE: 011 OF 061 
There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday 
affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and 
how much weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use 
in making the more important decisions in your everyday dealings are the 
same considerations you should apply in your deliberations in this case, 
Comment: 
This instruction is a revision of IDJI 100, to clarify the language and eliminate 
unnecessary verbiage. It also supercedes and replaces IDJI 120 and 121. 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (20B) B79-
IDJI 1.01 - Deliberation procedures 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
PAGE: 012 OF 061 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you 
my instructions concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits 
that have been admitted into evidence and any notes taken by you in the 
course of the trial proceedings. 
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is 
not thereby diverted from the witness or his testimony; and you must 
keep your notes to yourself and not show them to other persons or 
jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial. 
7(15/2009 5:25 PM -~OM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879- PAGE: 013 OF 061 
IDJI 1.03 - Admonition to jury 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
There are certain things you must not do during this trial: 
1. You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of 
the attorneys or their employees, or any of the witnesses. 
2 You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit 
anyone to discuss the case with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the 
.case with you, or to influence your decision in the case, you must report 
it to me promptly. 
3. You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you 
retire to the jury room to deliberate at the close of the entire case. 
4. You must not make up your mind until you have heard 
all of the testimony and have received my instructions as to the law that 
applies to the case. 
5. You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or 
gain a greater understanding of the case. 
6. You must not go to the place where any alleged event 
occurred. 
Comment: 
This instruction is an outline of the elements often stated to jurors at the beginning of 
a trial. See, lRCP 47(n). It is perhaps preferable to use the elements of this instruction as a 
guide for a more informal explanation to the jury of the necessary conduct expected of them, 
including reasons and examples as appropriate. 
7/15/2009 5: 25 ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879- 7- PAGE: 014 OF 061 
IDJI 1.03.1 - Admonition to jury - short form 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Members of the jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss 
this case among yourselves or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion 
as to the merits of the case, until after I fmally submit the case to you. 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM -~OM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 87 
mll 1. 05 - Statement of claims not evidence 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
PAGE: 015 OF 061 
Any statement by me identifying a claim. of a party is not 
evidence in this case. I have advised you of the claims of the parties 
merely to acquaint you with the issues to be decided. 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM -qQM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879-6£· PAGE: 016 OF 061 
IDJI 1.07 - Facts not in dispute 
INSTRUCTIQN..~ 
The fQHowing facts afe not in dispute: 
1. Defendant and Counterclahnantr1Ying Joseph Ranch, LLC is an Idaho 
Limited Liability Company with its registered agent in Blaine County, State of Idaho. 
2. Defendant and Counterclaimant J.C. Investments, Inc. is a foreign 
Corporation with its registered agent in King, County, State of Washington. 
3. Plaintiff and Counter-defendant Pines Grazing Association, Inc. ("Pines 
Grazing") is a dissolved Idaho nonprofit corporation with its principal place of business 
in Custer County, State ofIdaho. 
4. On April 15, 2005 Defendants purchased 3,832 acres of real 
property known as Pines Ranch and paid Plaintiff three million, eight hundred and 
thirty two thousand dollars ($3,832,000.00) for the real property known as Pines 
Ranch. 
5. The Lemhi County Parcels, at issue in this case, consist of 
approximately 80 acres and are an integral part of Pines Ranch and a major reason 
why Defendants purchased Pines Ranch. Plaintiff assured Defendants that he could 
acquire the Lemhi County Parcels directly from Lemhi County. As it turned out, 
Plaintiff was not able to acquire the Lemhi County Parcels directly from Lemhi 
County and the Lemhi County Parcels had to be sold at public auction. 
6. Plaintifflnever oWned the Lemhi County Parcels, consisting 
of approximately 80 acres, which is the subject of this dispute. 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM FROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879 ~ PAGE: 017 OF 061 
7. Plaintiff was never and has never been a licensed real estate 
broker in the State of Idaho. 
8. Defendants promised to pay Plaintiff $1000 per acre for the 
Lemhi County Parcels based on the condition that the Plaintiff acquire the Lemhi 
County Parcels directly from Lemhi County, which the Plaintiff never did. 
9. The Lemhi County Parcels we¢ always, owned by Lemhi 
County, a fact neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendants understood in April 2005 . 
10. The Lemhi County Parcels could never be sold directly to the 
Plaintiff and had to be sold at public auction -- a fact, neither the Plaintiff nor the 
Defendants understood when they agreed that Defendants would pay the Plaintiff 
$1000 an acre for the Lemhi County Parcels. 
II. The Lemhi County Parcels were sold at public auction by 
Lemhi County on August 22, 2005. 
12. Defendants sent Scott Kartennan to the public auction on 
August 22, 2005 to bid on the Lemhi County Parcels on their behalf. 
13. Plaintiff and Defendants, through Kartennan, orally agreed 
that Plaintiff would not bid on the Lemhi County Parcels at auction and that 
Kartennan would bid on behalf of the Defendants for the Lemhi County Parcels. 
14. Plaintiff and Defendants never reduced their oral agreement 
made at the public auction, that Plaintiff would not bid at the public auction, t~ 
writing. 
15. Defendants acquired the Lemhi County Parcels at public 
auction for $35,012.00. 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM -~OM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 679- PAGE: 016 OF 061 
16. After the public auction, Defendants sent Plaintiff a release 
and settlement agreement which was not accepted by the Plaintiff. 
17. This law suit is brought by the Plaintiff asking Defendants to 
pay Plaintiff additional monies for the Lemhi County Parcels, which the Plaintiff 
never )owned. Plaintiff is seeking the difference between what Defendants paid at 
public auction ($35,012.00) and the $1000 an acre Defendants allegedly agreed to 
pay the Plaintiff ($80,000.00). 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM wROM: Cynthia J woolley TO: +1 (208) 879- -~ PAGE: 019 OF 061 
IDJI 1.09 - Quotient verdicts 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions 
to another or decide any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin 
or drawing of straws. H money damages are to be awarded or 
percentages of fauIt are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to 
average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of 
determining the amount of the damage award or percentage of 
negligence. 
7/15/2009 5:25 '~OM: Cynthia u Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879 PAGE: 020 OF 061 
IDJI 1.11 - Communications with court 
INSTRUCTION NO._ 
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to 
communicate with me, you may send a note signed by one or more of 
you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me by any 
means other than such a note. 
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how 
the jury stands on any of the questions before you, numerically or 
otherwise, unless requested to do so by me. 
7/15/2009 5: 25 VROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879 
IDJI 1.20.1 - Burden of proof - preponderance of evidence 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
PAGE: 021 OF 061 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a 
proposition, or use the expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I 
mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably true 
than not true. 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO; +1 (208) 879-66- PAGE: 022 OF 061 
IDJI 1.20.2 - Burden of proof - clear and convincing evidence 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by 
clear and convincing evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is 
highly probable that such proposition is true. This is a higher burden 
than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than 
not true. 
7/15/2009 5:25 ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: t1 (208) 879- PAGE: 023 OF 061 
IDJI 1.22 - Deposition testimony 
INSTRUCTION NO._ 
Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition. 
A deposition is testimony taken under oath before the trial and 
preserved in writing [and upon video tape]. This evidence is entitled to 
the same consideration you would give had the witness testified from the 
witness stand. 
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although 
there is a record of the testimony you are about to hear, this record will 
not be available to you during your deliberations. 
Comment: 
The last sentence has been added to IDJI 124 to anticipate inquiry from the jury. 
7/15/2009 5: 2S FROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879-
IDJlI.24.2 - Circumstantial evidence with definition 
INSTRUCTION NO 
PAGE: 024 OF 061 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence 
is evidence that directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is 
evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one or more facts 
from which the fact at issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial 
evidence as to the degree of proof required; each is accepted as a 
reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such convincing 
force as it may carry. 
Comments; 
Two alternatives are offered, one including a brief definition of the teml 
"circumstantial" and one without. The committee felt that the essential point to the 
instruction is that there is no difference in degree of proof required between direct and 
circumstantial evidence, and that the definition of the tenn "circumstantial" is 
cumbersome and unnecessary. The recommendation is to use the first alternative is the 
usual case. However, if the lawyers would not be permitted to explain circumstantial 
evidence by example within the context of the case during argument, it may be necessary 
to request the second alternative. 
7/15/2009 5: 25 ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 679-
IDJI 1.28 - Evidence admitted for limited purpose 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
PAGE: 025 OF 061 
In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. 
I called your attention to this when the evidence was admitted. I remind 
you that whenever evidence was admitted for a limited purpose, you 
must not consider such evidence for any purpose other than the limited 
purpose for which it was admitted. 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: t1 (208) 879 
No evidence on presumed facts 
Basic facts undisputed 
-- GIVE 1.30.1 (Binding instruction) 
No evidence on presumed fact 
Disputed evidence on basic fact 
-- GIVE 1.30.2 
Some evidence on existence of presumed fact 
Disputed evidence on existence of basic facts 
-- GIVE 1.30.3 
Any substantial evidence on non-existence of presumed fact; 
presumption is rebutted and evaporates. 
-- NO instructions in 1.30 area 
Instruction 1.30.1 
PAGE: 026 OF 061 
1. Defendant and Counterclaimant Flying Joseph Ranch, LLC is an Idaho 
Limited Liability Company with its registered agent in Blaine County, State ofIdaho. 
2. Defendant and Counterclaimant J .C. Investments, Inc. is a foreign 
Corporation with its registered agent in King, County, State of Washington. 
3. Plaintiff and Counter-<iefendant Pines Grazing Association, Inc. ("Pines 
Grazing") is a dissolved Idaho nonprofit corporation with its principal place of business 
in Custer County, State of Idaho. 
4. On April 15, 2005 Defendants purchased 3,832 acres ofrea1 
property known as Pines Ranch and paid Plaintiff three million, eight hundred and 
thirty two thousand dollars ($3,832,000.00) for the real property known as Pines 
Ranch. 
S. The Lemhi County Parcels, at issue in this case, consist of 
approximately 80 acres and are an integral part of Pines Ranch and a major reason 
why Defendants purchased Pines Ranch. Plaintiff assured Defendants that he could 
7/15/2009 5:25 FROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 8 PAGE: 027 OF 061 
acquire the Lemhi County Parcels directly from Lemhi County. As it turned out, 
Plaintiff was not able to acquire the Lemhi County Parcels directly from Lemhi 
County and the Lemhi County Parcels had to be sold at public auction. 
6. Plaintiff never owned the Lemhi County Parcels, consisting 
of approximately 80 acres, which is the subject of this dispute. 
7. Plaintiff was never and has never been a licensed real estate 
broker in the State ofIdaho. 
8. Defendants promised to pay Plaintiff $1000 per acre for the 
Lemhi County Parcels based on the condition that the Plaintiff acquire the Lemhi 
County Parcels directly from Lemhi County, which the Plaintiff never did. 
9. The Lemhi County Parcels were always owned by Lemhi 
County, a fact neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendants understood in April 2005. 
10. The Lemhi County Parcels could never be sold directly to the 
Plaintiff and had to be sold at public auction --- a fact, neither the Plaintiff nor the 
Defendants understood when they agreed that Defendants would pay the Plaintiff 
$1000 an acre for the Lemhi County Parcels. 
11. The Lemhi County Parcels were sold at public auction by 
Lemhi County on August 22, 2005. 
12. Defendants sent Scott Karterman to the public auction on 
August 22, 2005 to bid on the Lemhi County Parcels on their behalf. 
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13. Plaintiff and Defendants, through Karterman, orally agreed 
that Plaintiff would not bid on the Lemhi County Parcels at auction and that 
Kartennan would bid on behalf of the Defendants for the Lemhi County Parcels. 
14. Plaintiff and Defendants never reduced their oral agreement 
made at the public auction, that Plaintiff would not bid at the public auction, to 
writing. 
15. Defendants acquired the Lemhi County Parcels at public 
auction for $35,012.00. 
16. After the public auction, Defendants sent Plaintiff a release 
and settlement agreement which was not accepted by the Plaintiff. 
17. This law suit is brought by the Plaintiff asking Defendants to 
pay Plaintiff additional monies for the Lemhi County Parcels, which the Plaintiff 
never owned. Plaintiff is seeking the difference between what Defendants paid at 
public auction ($35,012.00) and the $1000 an acre Defendants allegedly agreed to 
pay the Plaintiff ($80,000.00). 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879-6r -- PAGE: 029 OF 061 
IDIT 6.01.1 - Elements of contract· introductory 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A contract is an agreement between two or more parties to do or not do 
something that is supported by consideration. 
There are four elements to complete a contract Every contract must 
have these four elements. The four elements are: 
1. Competent parties; 
2. A lawful purpose; 
3. VaJid consideration; and 
4. Mutual agreement by all parti~s to aU essential terms. 
It is not disputed that the following element is present in the contract 
alleged by the Plaintiff in this case: (1) that the parties were competent to 
contract. 
It is disputed wh~ther it was a lawful contract, whether there was valid 
consideration and whether there was mutual agreement by the Plaintiff and 
Defendants as to the essential terms of the contract. 
Ill~/GUU9 5:25 PM VROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) PAGE: 030 OF 061 
IDJI 6.03.1 - Lawful purpose 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case, Defendants allege that the contract did not have a 
lawful purpose for two reasons: (1) Because it is illegal to agree not to 
bid at a public auction; and (2) it is illegal for anyone to seek money 
regarding the sale of property it does not own unless they are a licensed 
Idaho real estate broker. Plaintiff is not and never has been a licensed 
Idaho real estate broker. 
The purpose for which the contract was made, and the actions or 
non-actions expected of the parties in order to perform under the 
contract, must all be lawful when the contract was made. 
Comment: 
Whether a particular purpose is lawful is a question of law for the court. What the 
purpose of the contract was is a question of fact for the jury, if disputed. 
A fact specific instruction should be given as to which purposes raised in the case 
are lawful or unlawful. 
7!l 5/2009 5: 25 FROM: cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879- PAGE: 031 OF 061 
IDJI 6.04.1 - Consideration 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case, Defendants allege that there was no consideration to 
support the existence of a contract. 
A promise is not enforceable as a contract unless something of 
value was given or was agreed to be given in exchange for it. In law, the 
giving of value or agreement to give value is caUed "consideration." 
Consideration is the benefit given or agreed to be given by one party in 
exchange for the other party's performance or promise to perform. 
Consideration can be a promise to do something the party is not 
required to do, or a promise not to do something the party otherwise 
would be free to do. 
Consideration must have value; if it has no value at all, it is not 
sufficient. If the parties have agreed upon the specific consideration to 
be given in this case, then any value, however slight, is sufficient. 
7{15{2009 5:25 PM Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) PAGE: 032 OF 061 
IDR 6.05. I - Agreement on all material terms 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case, Defendants allege that Plaintiff and Defendants did 
not agree to all the esseutial terms of the alleged contract because both 
Plaintiff and Defendants incorrectly assumed that Plaintiff couId 
requirement is sometimes referred to as the "meeting of the minds," 
and means that an parties to a contract must have understood and 
accepted aU of the essential terms of the contract. 
There is no contract unless aD of the essential terms have been 
communicated to an parties, understood by an parties, and accepted by 
aU parties. The fanare of both Plaintiff and Defendants to understand 
that Plaintiff could never acquire the Lemhi County Parcels directly 
from Lemhi County Jndicates that the parties did not agree to all the 
essential terms of a binding contract and that there is no enforceable 
contract. H there is no enforceable contract, then you must find for the 
Defendants. 
7/15/2009 5:25 FROM: Cynthia J woolley TO: +1 (208) 879- ' PAGE: 033 OF 061 
IDJI 6.05.7 - Mutual mistake 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, 
share a misconception regarding a basic assumption or vital fact upon which 
the bargain is based. 
Comment; 
Hines v. Hines, 129 Id. 847, 853 (1997); Dennet v. Kuenzli, 130 Id. 27 (Ct. App. 
1997); Moore v. Mullen, 123 Id. 985, 988 (Ct. App. 1993); Leydet v. City of Mountain 
Home, 119 rd. 1041. 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM FROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879-f" PAGE: 035 OF 061 
IDlI 6.06.4 - Certain agreements must be in writing 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Certain contracts must be in writing to be enforceable, such as 
contracts for the purchase and sale of real estate. If such a contract is 
not in writing, it simply means that the contract may not be enforced in 
court. If you fmd that Plaintiff's claims relate to the enforcement of a 
contract for the sale of real property which was not reduced to writing, 
you must find for the Defendants. 
7/15/2009 5: 25 ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: t1 (208) 87 PAGE: 036 OF 061 
IDJI 6.07.2 ~ Unjust enrichment - equitable theories 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Even though there is no agreement between the parties, under 
certain circumstances where a party has been unjustly enriched by the 
actions of another the law will require that party to compensate the 
other for the unjust gain. To recover under this theory, the Plaintiff has 
the burden of proving each of the following: 
1. The Plaintiff provided a benefit to the Defendants; 
2. The Defendants accepted the benefit; and 
, 
3. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the 
Defendants to retain the benefit without compensating the Plaintiff for 
its value. 
Comment: 
For the elements of unjust enrichment, see Hertz v. Fiscus, 98 Idaho 456,567 
P.2d 1 (1977); Common Builder. Inc. v. ruce. 126 Idaho 616, 888 P.2d 790 (App. 1995). 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 87 PAGE: 037 OF 061 
IDJI 6.08.2 - Interpretation of contract - witness's testimony, ambiguity of contract 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract 
offered by any witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before 
execution of the written agreement, which is inconsistent with the plain, 
ordinary meaning of the written agreement While you may consider the 
testimony of witnesses if necessary to clarify an ambiguity, you may not 
consider such testimony to completely change the agreement, or to construe a 
term of the agreement in such a fashion that it no longer fits with the other, 
non-ambiguous terms or parts. 
7/15/2009 5:25 FROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) B PAGE: 038 OF 061 
IDJ16.08.4 -Interpretation of contract - definition of material fact 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A It material fact" is one which constitutes substantially the 
consideration of the contract, or without which it would not have been made. 
Comments: 
Black's Law Dictionary (West Pub; Fifth Ed., 1979) 
7/15/2009 5: 25 FROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879- 7? PAGE: 039 OF 061 
IDn 6.08.5 - Interpretation of contract - materiality 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
"Materiality" refers to the importance of the representation in 
determining the party's course of action. A representation is material if (a) a 
reasonable person would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in 
determining a choice of action in the transaction in question, or (b) the maker 
of the representation knows or has reason to know that the recipient is likely to 
regard the matter as important in determining the choice of action, whether or 
not a reasonable person would so consider. 
Comments: 
Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616 (1998) (tort standard, refening to Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, Sections 538(2).) 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM FROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 87 ? PAGE: 040 OF 061 
IDJI 6.10.1 - Breach of bilateral contract - general case - no affinnative defenses 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The Plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following 
propositions: 
1. A contract existed between Plaintiff and Defendants; 
2. The Defendants breached the contract; 
3. The Plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
H you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each 
of the propositions required of the Plaintiff has been proved, then you 
must consider the issue of the afUrmative defenses raised by the 
Defendants, and explained in the next instruction. If you fmd from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions in this 
instruction has not been proved, your verdict should be for the 
Defendants. 
7{15{2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: t1 (208) 
IDJI 6.10.4 - General contract - affirmative defenses 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
? PAGE: 041 OF 061 
In this case the Defendants have asserted certain affirmative 
defenses. The Defendants have the burden of proof on each of the 
affirmative defenses asserted as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint fails to state a valid cause of 
action under Idaho law. 
2. Even assuming there was a lawful contract between Plaintiff and 
Defendants (which Defendants dispute), Plaintiff has no right to 
enforce tlrls contract because it breached the contract because it never 
owned the Lemhi County Parcels it was trying to sell to the Plaintiff. 
3. Even assuming there was a lawful contract between Plaintiff and 
Defendants (which Defendants dispute), Plaintiff has no right to 
enforce tbls contract because it breached the contract because 
Plaintiff was never a licensed Idaho broker and accordingly is not 
entitled to collect any monies for the sale of the Lemhi County 
Parcels under Idaho law. 
4. Plaintiff has failed to establish any damages because Plaintiff never 
owned the Lemhi County Parcels. 
5. Plaintiffwaived its right to collect any monies from the Defendants 
because it voluntarily agreed not to bid on the Lemhi County Parcels 
at public auction. 
. 6. Plaintiff has failed to plead or establish the existence of an 
enforceable contract under Idaho law. 
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7. Plaintiff's contractual claims are unenforceable because of mutual 
mistake because both Plaintiff and Defendants mistakenly thought 
that Plaintiff could buy the property directly from Lemhi County, 
which was untrue. 
8. Plaintiff's clahns are Wlenforceable under the Idaho Statute of Frauds 
which requires all contracts regarding the sale of property to be in 
writing. 
9. Plaintiff's claims fail under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 
,10. Plaintiff's claims fail because Plaintiff has already been paid for the 
real property it actually owned and sold to the Defendants. 
11. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of impossibility of 
performance. 
12. Plaintiff's claims are barred because the oral agreement not to bid at 
public auction was illegal and tmenforceable. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of 
these affirmative defenses has been proved, then your verdict should be for 
the Defendants. 
7/l 5/2009 5: 25 VROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879 PAGE: 043 OF 061 
IDn 6.11 - Material breach 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A "material breach of contract," as that term is used in these 
instructions, means a breach that defeats a fundamental purpose of the 
contract. 
Comments: 
Ervin Const. v. Van Orden, 125 Id. 695, 699 (1993) 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879- PAGE: 044 OF 061 
IDJI 6.12 - Reasonable satisfaction requirement 
INSTRUcrIONNO. 
Where a contract includes a provision requiring performance to the 
satisfaction of a party, or similar language, and the level or quafity of 
performance is not otherwise spelled out, a party may reject the performance 
by the other party, upon groUJ\ds of dissatisfaction, only where a reasonable 
person in the same situation would find the performance unsatisfactory. 
Comment: 
See Cheney v. Jenimitt, 107 Idaho 829 (1984); compare Merideth Corp. v. Design 
Lithograph Center, 101 Idaho 391, (1980) where contract required actual personal satisfaction. 
1/15/2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 819-667 ? PAGE: 045 OF 061 
IDll 6.13 - Performance of contract - substantial performance 
lNSTRUCfION NO. 
When I say that a party must have "substantially performed" the 
contract or that "substantial performance" of the contract is required, I mean 
that the important and essential benefits caned for by the terms of the contract 
have been delivered or performed. A contract may be substantially performed 
even though there may have been some deviations or omissions from the 
performance caned for by the precise language of the contract 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879-66?? PAGE: 046 OF 061 
IDJI 6.14.1 • Time for perfonnance of a contract 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Where a contract does not specify a time for performance, the law will 
imply a requirement that it be performed within a reasonable time, as is 
determined by the subject matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, 
and the nature of the performance required. In such case, it is for the jury to 
determine what a reasonable time would be under the circumstances, given all 
of the evidence in the case. 
7/15/2009 5:25 ~ROM: cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 87 ~ PAGE: 047 OF 061 
mn 6.22.1 - Equitable estoppel 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The Defendants have asserted the affirmative defense of 
equitable estoppel. This is a legal term which means the Plaintiff may 
be prevented from enforcing a contract or term of contract by reason of 
the plaintiff's own conduct 
To establish the defense of equitable estoppel, the Defendants 
have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. The Plaintiff falsely represented or concealed a material 
fact to the Defendants; 
2. The Plaintiff knew or should have known the true facts; 
3. The Defendants did not know and could not discover the 
true facts; 
4. The Defendants relied on the misrepresentation or 
concealment to the Defendants' prejudice. 
Comment: 
Willig v. Dept. of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261 (1995); Medical Servo 
Group v. Boise Lodge,310, 126 Idaho 90, 95 (1994 Ct. App.); Tommerup v. Albertson's, 
Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 5-6 (1980); Bjornstad v. Peny, 92 Idaho 402 (1968). Quasi-estoppel; 
Quasi estoppel is distinguished from equitable estoppel in that no concealment or 
misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side, no ignorance or reliance on the other, 
is a necessary ingredient. The doctrine of quasi estoppel applies when it would be 
unconscionable to allow a party to assert a right which is inconsistent with a prior 
position. Willig v. State D<a>t. of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261 (1995). 
Determination of the application of the doctrine of quasi estoppel is an equitable issue for 
the court to determine, and not a jury issue. The jury may be asked to determine the 
existence of predicate facts, but would not be instructed on the application of the 
doctrine. 
7/15/2009 5: 25 ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (20B) B ? PAGE: 04B OF 061 
IDJI 6.22.2 - Waiver by estoppel 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The Defendants have raised the defense of waiver by estoppel. 
This is a legal term which means that a party is deemed to have waived 
a claimed breach of contract by reason of the party's own conduct. To 
establish the defense of waiver by estoppel, the Defendants have the 
burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. The Plaintiff represented to the Defendants [by words or 
conduct] [or] [by silence when a duty to speak and protest the action of 
the defendant existed] that Plaintiff was waiving, excusing or forgiving 
the Defendants' breach of contract; and 
2. The Defendants relied upon this representation and 
materially changed position in reliance thereon; and 
3. The reliance was reasonable in light of all of the 
circumstances; and 
4. The change of position was to the Defendants' detriment 
If you find that each of these propositions has been proved, you 
should fmd that the Defendants are not liable to the Plaintiff for the 
claimed breach of contract. If the Defendants fail to prove all of the 
propositions, the defendant has not established the aiTumative defense 
of estoppel. 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879-66~~ PAGE: 049 OF 061 
IDJI 6.24.1 - Waiver 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be 
evidenced by conduct, by words, or by acquiescence. 
Comment: 
Dennett v. Kuenzli, 131 Idaho 21, 936 P.2d 219 (1997) 
7115/2009 5: 25 ~ROM: Cynthia J woolley TO: +1 (208) 879- PAGE: 050 OF 061 
IDJI 6.24.2 - Release 
lNSTRUCfION NO. 
A release is a written declaration by a party that releases a particular 
claim or right to pursue a claim against another party. A release may be made 
with or without consideration. 
Comment: 
Restatement of Contracts (Second) §284 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879-66?~ PAGE: 051 OF 061 
IDn 6.26 - Impossibility as a defense 
Caution: Impossibility as a defense will invariably be based upon a specific fact 
circumstance. The pattern instruction focuses on the elements of the defense rather than 
on any attempt to catalog the circumstances giving rise to it. In the ordinary case, it may 
be necessary to include additional instructions addressing the specific circumstances of 
the case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case, the Defendants have claimed the defense of 
impOSSibility because of the fonowing circumstance: PlaintifJ never 
owned the Lemhi County Parcels and never could have acquired the 
Lemhi County Parcels from Lemhi County because it was required that 
the Lemhi County Parcels be sold at public auction. 
In order for this defense to apply, the Defendants have the 
burden of proof on each of the following: 
1. The circumstance aUeged by the Defendants exists or 
existed through no fault of the Defendants. 
2. The happening of this circumstance could not reasonably 
have been anticipated by the Defendants when the contract was entered 
into. 
3. The happening of this circumstance was not assigned or 
assumed as the responsibility of any party by the contract itself. 
4. The happening of this circumstance prevents the 
performance of the contract in its essential and important terms. 
H you find from your consideration of aU the evidence in the case 
that each of the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict 
7/15/2009 5: 25 ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (20B) 879 ? PAGE: 052 OF 061 
IDJI 6.27.1- Fraud 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
To establish the defense of fraud, the Defendants have the 
burden proving by clear and convincing evidence each of the following 
propositions: 
I. The Plaintiff made a representation of a past or present fact; 
2. The representation was false; 
3. The represented fact was important; 
4. The Plaintiff knew the representation was false (or acted with 
a reckless disregard of the truth of the representation); 
5. The Defendants were not aware of the falsity of the 
representation; 
6. The Plaintiff intended that Defendants rely upon the 
representation in agreeing to enter into the contract; 
7. The Defendants did rely upon the representation; 
8. The Defendants' reliance was justified; and 
9. The Defendants has offered to return to the Plaintiff whatever 
the Defendants would be legally obligated to return in order to prevent 
his being unjustly enriched. 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence in the case 
that each of the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict 
should be for the Defendants. If you fmd that any of the propositions 
has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the Plaintiff. 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879-667~ PAGE: 053 OF 061 
IDJI 6.27.3 - Defense of non -disclosure 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A party is not obligated to perform a contract if that party 
establishes the defense of nondisclosure. To establish the defense of 
non-disclosure, the Defendants have the burden of proving each of the 
following propositions by clear and convincing evidence. 
1. The Plaintiff was aware of a fact vital to the essence of the 
contract; 
2. The Defendants were unaware of the fact, and eould not 
reasonably learn of it; 
3. The Plaintiff knew that the Defendants were unaware of 
the true fact and knew that disclosure of the true fact would correct a 
basic assumption upon which the defendant was making the contract; 
4. The Plaintiff did not disclose the fact to the Defendants, 
intending that the Defendants would act in ignorance of the fact; 
5. The failure to disclose the true fact amounts to a failure to 
act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair 
dealing; [and1 
6. The Defendants entered into the contract upon the 
reasonable assumption that the non-disclosed fact did not exist; and 
7. Defendants returned or offered to return to the Plaintiff 
any benefit received under the contract which the Defendants should 
not, in fairness, retain if Defendants are to be relieved from the contract. 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM vROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 8 PAGE: 054 OF 061 
H you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence in the case 
that each of the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict 
should be for the Defendants. H you fmd that any of the propositions 
has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the Plaintiff. 
Corrunent: 
There is not definitive Idaho authority on point. This instruction is felt to be 
superior to the previous IOJI 651. See, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 161; 
obiter dicta in Janinda v. Lanning, 87 Idaho 97 (1964). 
7/15/2009 5: 25 ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) B79-
SECTION 9.00 - DAMAGES 
IDJI 9.00 - Cautionary instruction on damages 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
PAGE: 055 OF 061 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express 
any opinion as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM WROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: t1 (208) 879-667~ PAGE: 056 OF 061 
IDJI 9.03 - Damages for breach of contract - general fonnat 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If the jury decides the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the 
Defendants, the jury must determine the amount of money that will 
reasonable and fairly compensate the Plaintiff for any of the following 
elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the 
Defendants' breach of contract: 
Plaintiff must prove: (1) there was a lawful and binding contract 
under Idaho law; (2) that there was consideration given for the 
contract; (3) that Plaintiff and Defendants agreed to all the material 
terms of the contract; (4) that there was a meeting of the minds and no 
mutual mistake regarding the contract; and (5) that Plaintiff suffered 
damages by reason of Defendants' actions. 
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to 
determine. 
7/15/2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879- ? PAGE: 057 OF 061 
IDJI 1.13.1 Alternate form - concluding remarks 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary 
that at least three-fourths of the jury agree. Your verdict must 
represent the considered judgment of each juror agreeing to it. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to 
deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so 
without violence to individual judgment Each of you must decide the 
case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the 
evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do 
not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if 
convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction 
as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of 
your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. 
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges of the facts. 
Your sole interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case. 
7(15(2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879-66" PAGE: 058 OF 061 
IDJI 1.15.1 Completion ofyerdict form- general verdict 
INSTRUCfION NO. 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a 
foreman, who will preside over your deliberations. 
Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you with any 
instructions. Use only the ones conforming to your conclusions and 
return the others unused. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or 
nine of you. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign 
it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so 
agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will 
notify the bailiff, who will then return you into open court. 
7(15(2009 5:25 PM ~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley TO: +1 (208) 879- PAGE: 059 OF 061 
IDJI 1.15.2 - Completion of verdict form on special interrogatories 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a 
foreman, who will preside over your deliberations. 
An appropriate form ofverdid will be submitted to you with any 
instructions. Follow the directions on the verdict form, and answer all 
of the questions required of you by the instructions on the verdict form. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or 
nine of you. As soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each 
of the required questions in the verdict, you should fill it out as 
instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine 
agree on each question. H your verdict is unanimous, your foreman 
alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, 
then those so agreeing will sign the verdict 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will 
notify the bailiff, who will then retum you into open court. 
Comment: 
Two fonns are set forth, one for use with a general verdict and one 
for use with special interrogatories. There are still some ambiguities, such 
as exactly who signs the final verdict when the same jurors do not agree to 
each question. However, pattern instructions drafted to fit every 
circumstance became too cumbersome. The committee detennined that 
the above instruction was sufficient to meet the general case; that if an 
ambiguous circumstance arose which the jury could not work out for 
themselves, they could request further instructions from the court. 
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IDJI 1.17 - Post verdict jury instruction 
INSTRUCTION NO . 
..,... 
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IDJI 1.17 - Post verdict jury instruction 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and 
are discharged with the sincere thanks of this Court. You may now 
discuss this case 'With the attorneys or with anyone else. For your 
guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to 
anyone else, is entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss 
this case, if you want to, but you are not required to do so, and you may 
choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you choose to talk to 
someone about this case, you may tell them as much or as little as you 
like about your deliberations or the facts that influenced your decisions. 
If anyone persists in discussing the case over you.r objection, or becomes 
critical of your service, either before or after any discu.ssion has begun, 
you may report it to me. 
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IDJI 1.13 - Concluding remarks 
INSTRUCTION NO._ 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have 
instructed you regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the 
evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes counsel will present 
their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room 
for your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury 
deliberations. Therefore, the attitude and conduct of jurors at the 
beginning of the deliberations are important At the outset of 
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic 
expression of opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to 
vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense of pride may be 
aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if 
shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or 
advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no 
triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. 
Deliberate with the objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so 
without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you must decide 
this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and 
consideration of the case with your feUow jurors. 
